Introduction
Dividend-seeking cooperatives experience variation in their achieved dividend similar to the variation in profit found among profit-seeking capitalist firms. In testing various hypotheses about the comparative static behavior of cooperatives and contrasting their behavior to that of profit-seeking capitalist twins, empirical research has overlooked this variation in the dividend. The possibility of perverse behavior was introduced by Ward (1958) and Domar (1966) and has been analyzed by many subsequent writers, e.g., Neary (1988) and Kahana (1989) . Pencavel (2001) surveys the related comparison literature.
In this study, we develop an analytical framework within which we examine the dividend performance of a panel of 59 Spanish cooperative financial institutions (CFIs) from 1994 to 2001. We are not concerned with possible perversities in the behavior of optimizing cooperatives or in comparing their behavior to that of their twin savings and commercial banks. must be an employee representative. Thus, employee involvement in the Asamblea General influences the distribution of benefits between employees and non-employee members and, through the Consejo Rector, the business strategies that determine these benefits.
In practice, CFIs vary in determining interest payments on member capital accounts and distributing the available surplus. In 2001, mandatory contributions to the reserve fund ranged from the statutory minimum up to 90% and mandatory contributions to the education and promotion fund ranged from the statutory minimum up to 40%. Consequently the discretionary residual allocated by the Asamblea General ranged from zero up to 70%. This variation could depend on varying degrees of employee participation in CFI decision-making. Since we have no direct evidence on employee participation, we cannot test hypotheses concerning the effect of participation on performance as Estrin et al. (1987) do for other cooperatives.
Nonetheless, we have compelling evidence to support the hypothesis that CFI governance serves in the general interest of its employees, rather than its members. 5 First, employee benefits exceed considerably the negotiated minimum wages, and non-employee members do not receive these benefits. 6 Second, the interest rate paid on member capital accounts averages 4.8%, which is close to the statutory minimum, and reflects a tendency to retain after-tax profit within the CFI. Third, excluding CLP and CP, CFIs allocate 75% of the available surplus to the reserve fund, which exceeds considerably the mandatory minimum of 20%. These funds are retained within the CFI rather than distributed to members. Fourth, CFIs allocate 15% of the available surplus to the education and promotion fund, which is close to the mandatory minimum but also part of the generous employee benefits. Fifth, most of the available surplus disbursed at the Asamblea General takes the form of voluntary payments to the reserve fund, which reinforces the tendency to retain funds within the CFI rather than to distribute them to members.
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This distributional evidence is relevant to the question of whether CFIs are labor-managed firms or member-managed firms. In a pure labor-managed firm of the Ward -Domar type, members and employees coincide, so that the issue does not arise. In the subsequent literature, decision-making power rests with members, who may hire employees. Hence, optimizing behavior may lead to shrinking membership and expanding hired employment so that the firm degenerates to its capitalist twin (Ben -Ner, 1984 , Miyazaki, 1984 .
In contrast, Spanish CFIs allow employees to exert disproportionate control in at least the distributional aspects of managerial decision-making. In addition, the member/employee ratio increases in CFIs, because employee selfinterest requires a sufficient number of members to provide the deposits to employees. Thus, we characterize CFIs as labor-managed firms that require members to provide financing to support growth opportunities.
The Analytical Framework
Following the tradition initiated by Ward and Domar, we assume that cooperatives seek to maximize the dividend, or value added per employee.
The dividend, denoted D, is defined as:
where π represents the available surplus after taxes and interest payments on member accounts, w L represents the wage and L represents the labor input.
Value added, denoted by pY -w T X, is equal to revenue pY, where p and Y are scalar output price and quantity, minus non-labor expense w T X, where w and X are price and quantity vectors of other inputs and T is the transpose operator. Thus, employee income consists of a wage, w L , and the available surplus per employee, π/L. Although restrictions are imposed on the distribution of the available surplus, most of it is retained within the cooperative; very little is distributed to non-member employees.
From the first equality in equation (1), the variation in the dividend can be attributed to variations in quantities, i.e., Y,X and L, and to variations in prices, i.e., p and w. The second equality indicates that dividend variation also depends on variation in the value of labor productivity, i.e., p(Y/L), and to variation in the cost of other inputs per worker, i.e., w T (X/L), which we refer to as the cost of input deepening. Furthermore, dividend variation may be influenced by differences in technology, by differences in the cost efficiency with which other inputs are allocated, and by an activity effect that reflects the ability to convert input deepening into increased labor productivity. Figure 1 illustrates these decompositions of the variation in the dividend.
Insert Figure 1 about here
We develop an intertemporal decomposition from period t to period t+1, although the same approach could also be used to generate a multilateral decomposition. Denoting output per worker, i.e., Y/L, as y and the normalized input vector, i.e., X/L, as x, in equation (1) we have:
Equation (2) combines Paasche-type price changes using comparison period quantity weights with Laspeyres-type quantity changes using base period price weights; equation (3) does the opposite.
Since both Paasche and Laspeyres indexes suffer from well-known shortcomings, we combine equations (2) and (3) to obtain:
Equation ( The first term on the right side of (4) is the price effect, denoted ∆P in Figure 1 . This term measures the contribution of price changes, holding quantities fixed at their arithmetic mean values, to changes in the dividend.
The price effect is the difference between an output price effect and an input Figure 1 ; it measures the contribution of quantity changes, holding prices fixed at their arithmetic mean values, to changes in the dividend. The quantity effect is the difference between a labor productivity effect, denoted ∆(Y/L) in Figure 1 , and an input deepening effect, denoted ∆(X/L) in Figure 1 . Input deepening decreases the dividend because other inputs are costly, but it enhances labor productivity, which increases the dividend. 10 The quantity effect can be decomposed further as the following proposition demonstrates.
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Proposition: The quantity effect decomposes as follows:
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 2 . The production sets in periods t and t+1 are labeled T t and T
t+1
. Production in period t uses x t to ). This component contributes to or detracts from the dividend change as other inputs are allocated in a more or less cost-efficient manner in period t+1 than they were in period t, with the change being evaluated at arithmetic mean input prices. ). Since both points are on the boundary of T t+1 , the activity effect contributes to or detracts from the dividend change as the change in the value of output per worker exceeds or falls short of the change in the cost of other inputs per worker, with the changes being evaluated at arithmetic mean output and input prices. Thus, the activity effect is a quantity effect that is net of changes in technology and changes in cost efficiency and is expressed in value terms.
Insert Figure 2 about here
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To summarize, dividend variation is attributable partly to variation in the prices cooperatives receive for their products and variation in the prices they pay for their non-labor inputs. In addition, dividend variation is attributable to variation in quantities, which consists of the variation in the value of output per worker less the variation in the cost of other inputs used per worker. The proposition demonstrates that variation in quantities can be partitioned into three components, namely variation in cost efficiency, variation in technology, and an activity effect. We quantify these three sources of dividend variation.
The Decomposition
The decomposition into price and quantity effects and the decomposition of the quantity effect into labor productivity and input deepening effects can be achieved by straightforward computations based on , and measures the performance of each producer relative to the best practice observed in the sample.
To identify xCE t and x CE t+1 we construct production frontiers for years t and t+1 and we compare these production frontiers to identify y At . In conventional DEA, a best practice frontier for year t is constructed from data on all producers in year t. Consequently, best practices in previous years are not used in year t. Our extension allows the best practice in year t to be constructed from data on all producers in all years prior to and including year t. Hence, best practices in previous years are remembered and remain available for adoption in the current year. We define the feasible set of production activities in year t as:
Hence, (y,x) is bounded above by a piecewise linear envelope characterizing the best practice observed in all years from year 1 through year t inclusive. In 
For any cooperative designated o in year t, the cost-efficient normalized input vector xCE o t is the vector x that minimizes w otT x, subject to the constraint that , for all cooperatives in all years. Inserting these quantities into the proposition generates a complete decomposition of variation of the dividend, both over time and across cooperatives. In the next section we use data from our sample of Spanish CFIs to calculate these sources of variation in the dividend of cooperatives. As expected in an increasingly competitive financial services market, the variation in pricing power is minimal with annual coefficients of variation of output prices and input prices averaging less than 10% except for nonfinancial assets. In contrast, the coefficients of variation of output quantities and input quantities average 190%. Hence, we expect price effects to be dominated by quantity effects as sources of dividend variation. The relative uniformity of wages, with an average coefficient of variation of 15%, does not imply a relatively efficient allocation of labor because employment decisions depend on the dividend rather than on wages. The coefficient of variation of the dividend has remained stable at an average of 33% over the period. Table 2 provides an initial decomposition of the dividend variation, both annually and for the entire period. On average, the dividend increases annually by €2,400. This growth reflects the impact of a substantial decline in the Bennet price indicator countervailed by a larger increase in the Bennet quantity indicator. In equation (4), the price indicator is quantity-weighted and the quantity indicator is price-weighted. Hence, a negative price effect indicates that price changes lead to an average annual reduction in the dividend of €3,210. However, this decrease is more than offset by quantity growth that generates an average annual increase in the dividend of €5,610.
Data and Decomposition Results
Therefore, dividend performance improves over the period despite a deteriorating price structure.
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The final two columns of Table 2 provide an initial decomposition of the quantity effect. Since quantity effects are price-weighted, these results suggest that the value of output per worker increased by far more than did the cost of other inputs per worker. The labor productivity effect generated an average annual increase in the dividend of €11,830, while the input deepening effect caused an average annual reduction in the dividend of €6,220. 18 Hence, although input deepening is costly, it is productive and profitable at a positive spread. Table 3 provides the decomposition of the quantity effect, both annually and for the entire period. The activity effect accounts for more than the entire quantity effect, contributing an average annual increase of €6,480
to the dividend. This result is consistent with our argument that CFIs are motivated to expand internally by increasing their memberships, which provide the deposits to finance growth. The activity effect is augmented by a small improvement in technology that enhanced labor productivity and led to an average annual increase of €290 in the dividend. Offsetting these two effects is a general deterioration in cost efficiency that led to an average annual decline of €1,160. To summarize our aggregate time series findings, the observed upward trend in the dividend occurs despite a continuing decline in the spread between the rates of return on loans and investments and interest rates paid to depositors, which generate an adverse price effect. In addition, input deepening is costly and generates an adverse impact on the quantity effect.
However, input deepening has three impacts on the increase in labor productivity, two of which are favorable. Increases in deposits per worker fund increases in loans and investments per worker, which enhances labor productivity and raises the dividend because the spread is positive although declining. Increases in non-financial capital per worker, e.g., investments in information technology, generate improvements in technology, which also enhances labor productivity and raises the dividend. However, input deepening does not occur in a cost-efficient manner, given input price trends; the decline in cost efficiency causes a small reduction in labor productivity and reduces the dividend. Ironically, the decline in cost efficiency can be traced to over-investment in non-financial capital, the price of which declined modestly, rather than to excessive deposit taking, the price of which declined dramatically in the middle half of the period. The results of these exercises are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 contains benchmarking results averaged over CFIs having smaller dividends than CLP to investigate what these less-successful CFIs can learn from CLP. while the number of more-successful CFIs ranges from two to 13. Since both sets of benchmarking results are consistent from year to year, we discuss the
Comparisons Between CLP and Other Spanish CFIs
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here
In 2001, CLP generated a dividend that was €32,620 larger than the average dividend earned by the 47 less-successful CFIs. Since CLP had a slightly less favorable price structure, the entire dividend difference of €36,540 is attributable to CLP's larger quantity effect. Although CLP incurred deposit and operating expenses averaging nearly €60,000 more than those of the less-successful CFIs, input deepening raised the value of output per worker at CLP by nearly €100,000 over that of the less-successful CFIs. This result is partly due to the almost one million depositors of the 130 Mondragón cooperatives that are members of CLP. The better performance also reflects the superior ability of CLP to convert deposits to loans, despite a smaller-tanaverage spread of 3.1%. Our decomposition of the quantity effect offers additional insight into CLP's dividend advantage. The quantity effect is attributable to a €55,260 activity effect, which is offser partially by a €18,720 cost efficiency reduction that reflects CLP's excessive reliance on nonfinancial capital. The decomposition results are consistent over time with the sole exception that CLP typically enjoyed a relatively favorable price structure. The lesson for less-successful CFIs is to attract more deposits and exploit their more favorable spread.
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The benchmarking results relative to the seven more-successful CFIs in 2001 are smaller in magnitude. Compared to these cooperatives, CLP has a dividend disadvantage of €16,580 even though its price structure is relatively favorable. The negative quantity effect may be attributed to a lower value of output per worker despite more extensive input deepening at CLP.
Alternatively, it may be attributed to lower cost efficiency at CLP, augmented by a negative activity effect. The lesson for CLP from more-successful CFIs is to improve cost efficiency first, and then implement procedures to facilitate the conversion of deposits to loans and investments at a more favorable spread.
To summarize the results of the two benchmarking exercises, CLP has a more favorable price structure in all years, except 2001, and lower cost efficiency in all years than either more-successful or less successful cooperatives. Since these effects are almost offsetting and the technology effect is irrelevant in cross-sectional analysis, the activity effect becomes the key determinant of dividend performance. The activity effect is a quantity effect that is net of variation in technology and the differences in cost efficiency. By this measure, CLP is more productive than the less-successful CFIs and less productive than the more-successful CFIs. Because the value of loans and investments is highly correlated with the value of deposits, this productivity variation is the main source of dividend variation. Over the entire sample, the ratio of the value of loans and investments to the value of deposits averages 1.05, with a standard deviation of 0.04. In 2001, six of the seven more-successful CFIs had ratios above that of CLP's at 1.07 and 44 of the 47 less-successful CFIs had ratios below that of CLP. Although input deepening is costly, a positive spread generates a proportionately larger value of output per worker and consequently a dividend advantage. This 28 result indicates that the ability to attract deposits and the ability to convert deposits to revenue-earning loans and investments are crucial to better dividend performance.
Summary and Conclusions
Dividend-seeking cooperatives of the Ward-Domar type adjust employment to equate the value of labor's marginal product with the value of the endogenously determined dividend. Therefore, variation in the dividend implies variation in the value of labor's marginal product leading to an inefficient allocation of labor among cooperatives. Limited labor mobility makes it likely that this resource misallocation will persist. We investigate the sources of dividend variation analytically and apply our technique to a panel of 59 Spanish cooperative financial institutions over the period from 1994 to 2001.
Our aggregate time series results indicate that dividend growth has been due primarily to input deepening, which has enhanced the value of output per worker more than proportionately to its cost. However, a substantial decline in returns on loans and investments, which was only partly offset by a smaller decline in interest paid on deposits, contributed adversely to dividend growth. Our cross-sectional benchmarking results in which we compare less-successful and more-successful CFIs to CLP reinforces the finding that input deepening is critical. Increases in deposits per worker generate proportionately larger increases in loans and investments per worker, which earn a positive spread. Variation in cost efficiency is large but it is unrelated to dividend performance as both groups are more cost-efficient than CLP. Variation in the price structure is also large and positively related to dividend performance in all years except for 2001.
Our results have implications for the misallocation of labor in a cooperative economy. Our data indicate that dividend variation has been large and persistent, with coefficient of variation remaining stable at 0.33. In 2001, one employee moving from a CFI with a dividend that is one standard deviation below the sample mean to a CFI with a dividend that is one standard deviation above the mean would generate a decline in the value of labor's marginal product of €49,460 at the former and an increase of €92,160
in the latter for a net gain of €42,700. This example indicates the cost of institutional and cultural constraints on the mobility of labor in the sector. In the financial sector, deposits are the source of loans and investments, so that variation in the ability to attract deposits and to convert them to profitable loans and investments is a critical source of dividend variation, and hence to labor misallocation. To the extent that variation in the ability to attract and convert deposits persists or increases among Spanish cooperative financial institutions, dividend variation and labor misallocation are likely to continue.
The misallocation is particularly acute in Spain because labor mobility is culturally constrained. All of these CFIs are included in our sample.
6 A partial list of additional benefits includes a quarterly salary bonus equal to one month's pay, full National Health Service benefits, a pension plan, a thirty-day paid vacation, paid leaves of absence for a variety of reasons, the availability of subsidized loans, educational support for employees and their children, and widow and orphan funds.
7 Excluding CLP and CP, which allocate 51% and 100%, respectively, of their Asamblea General funds to member cooperatives, and CR de Canarias, which allocates 90% of its Asamblea General funds to Investment for Canarias, 88% of the disbursements are put in the reserve fund. with the same coefficient of variation, and wages at commercial banks averaged 22% higher, with a larger coefficient of variation. However, employees of commercial banks do not receive benefits comparable to those given to cooperative employees from the available surplus. Relatively high wages in Spanish financial institutions are a lingering consequence of a tightly regulated system, which had been closed to most foreign competition. Caminal et al. (1993) provide an interesting history of the Spanish financial system. 17 The deteriorating price structure is reflected in a narrowing spread between returns on loans and investments and interest paid on deposits from 4.8% to 3.8%. On average, declining returns on loans and investments reduced the Bennet output price indicator by €11,540, while smaller but still substantial declines in deposit rates made up €8,090 of the €8,330 reduction in the Bennet input price indicator. 18 The input deepening effect of -€6,220 decomposes into a cost of deposits per worker effect of -€5,240 and a cost of capital per worker effect of -€980, averaged over all institutions and all years. Thus, the major source of input deepening has been an increase in deposits, which are used to fund loans and investments.
is consistent with general findings for financial institutions. Although information technology may be the engine of productivity growth, it typically works with a lag as institutions move down their learning curves. 21 In any given year, individual CFIs adopt different production practices but cross-section analysis is capable of constructing only a single best practice technology.
22 CLP's favorable large price indicator in all years except 2001 in Table 4 and in all years in Table 5 does not indicate pricing power. As Table 1 shows, little price variation is found across CFIs in any given year although considerable intertemporal price variation exists. CLP's large price effect is due to large quantity weights rather than to large price differences. 
